Measuring the Impact of Institutional and Occupational Affiliation on the Stances of Soviet Officials in the 1980-81 Polish Crisis

Curtis R. Brautigam
Chestnut Hill College

Following from the bureaucratic politics/interest group approach to Soviet foreign policy decision-making, the purpose of this article is to determine whether the stances of Soviet officials in the 1980-81 Polish crisis were affected by their institutional, occupational, or ethnic affiliation. The study found that, overall, there was not a strong relationship between group affiliation and tendency orientation. However, the results indicate that there were definite coalitions of groups and individuals espousing differing stances on Poland, and that there was a significant difference between the Politburo and Secretariat and the overall score for all other groups.

One of the fundamental assumptions of the bureaucratic politics approach as developed by Graham Allison (1971) and Morton Halperin (1974) is that the institutional or occupational affiliation of foreign policy decision-makers plays a major role in their articulations of particular foreign policy stances, as illustrated by the well-known maxim "Where you stand depends upon where you sit" (Also see Halperin and Kanter, 1973).[1] In the area of Soviet politics, there have also been numerous studies on the role of institutional and occupational affiliation in determining decision-makers' stances on particular issues (Aspaturian, 1971; Griffiths and Skilling, 1971; Valenta, 1979). One of the main assumptions of the interest group approach to Soviet politics as developed by Skilling (1983), Schwartz (1968), Stewart (1969), and Langsam and Paul (1972) is that the policy stances of Soviet officials in various policy issues are influenced by their institutional or occupational affiliation. Aspaturian (1971, pp. 585-586) argued that traditional sectors of the armed forces, heavy industrial managers, professional party apparatchiki and ideologues are believed to benefit from

63

increased international tension, and that the state bureaucracy, light industrial managers, cultural, professional, and scientific groups, and Soviet "consumers" are believed to benefit from a relaxation in international tensions.[2]

In the area of Soviet domestic policy, Jonathan Harris (1984) concluded that Soviet officials' stances on the issue of Communist Party intervention in economic management were dependent on their institutional and occupational affiliation. In his analysis of Soviet public statements on this issue from 1964 to 1966, he found that officials in the state apparatus, Central Committee secretaries in charge of theoretical education and cadre management, the first secretaries of republic Party organizations where nationalist dissent was a serious problem, many first secretaries of regional Party organizations in non-Russian republics, and those regional first secretaries who had previously served as the first secretaries of agricultural regions all opposed Party intervention in economic management. The first secretaries of republic Party organizations where nationalist dissent was not a problem and the regional first secretaries who had previously been first secretary of industrial regions tended to support party intervention in economic management.

A valuable case study in Soviet foreign policy that has applied the bureaucratic politics approach was Jiri Valenta's study (1979) of Soviet decision-making in the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. He concluded that intervention in Czechoslovakia was favored by individuals in certain institutional settings (the party apparatus in the Ukraine and republics in proximity to Czechoslovakia, ideologues, and certain sectors of the Soviet armed forces), while individuals in other settings opposed such action (the foreign policy apparatus, other sectors of the armed forces, and those Central Committee departments in charge of relations with non-ruling Communist Parties).

There were also some studies on the impact of the ethnic factor on Soviet decision-making in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Hodnett and Potichnyj, 1970; Valenta, 1979, pp. 102-104). Both works argued that officials in the Soviet republics in proximity to Czechoslovakia were particularly concerned about the crisis.

However, scholars of Soviet politics have been much better able to relate officials' public statements to stances on domestic policy issues than those of foreign policy. The reason is that Soviet official spokesmen on domestic policy issues are much more explicit in giving policy prescriptions than those on foreign policy issues. Spokesmen on foreign policy issues generally tend to provide definitions of the situation rather than explicit

64

policy recommendations. As a result, a scholar would have to infer the spokesman's policy preferences from the public statement.[3]

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of group affiliation on the stances of Soviet decision-makers and observers on the 1980-81 Polish crisis. The working hypothesis to be tested is that the stances of Soviet officials towards Poland during the 1980-81 Polish crisis are related to their institutional, occupational, or ethnic affiliation.

Methodology of the Study

In this study, a total of 173 statements or articulations by Soviet officials on Poland made between August 31, 1980 and December 13, 1981 were examined.[4] They were taken from a wide range of Soviet publications, as well as English-language translations of the relevant material in the Soviet media.[5]

Soviet officials and spokesmen were classified according to their institutional, occupational, or ethnic affiliation. A total of nine institutional settings were examined. They included: Politburo/Secretariat[6], KGB, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Department, Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties, International Information Department, trade unions, and Komsomol.

Note that there are important institutional and bureaucratic divisions within these various settings. For instance, the Ministry of Defense is divided into five branches of the armed forces (Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces, Navy, and Air Force), and individuals in each of these branches may have had their own distinct parochial and institutional concerns with regard to Poland. Such distinctions will not be addressed in this study, since the focus will be on each institution as a whole.

The occupational settings that were investigated included ideologists, economists and planners, the cultural establishment, and the writers. The ideologists basically consisted of Party officials or academics who were concerned with questions of Marxist-Leninist ideology. They tended to be agitprop specialists or academics who worked at various institutes, academics, or universities which had departments or faculties concerned with ideology-related matters. Economists and planners were those individuals who were either employed in universities or academies dealing with economic matters, or those engaged in the implementation of economic policy. The cultural establishment included those people concerned with culture, the arts and music.[7] The writers studied were those who were officially members of the USSR Writers' Union.

Seven different ethnic settings were investigated: Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, other non-Russian republics,

65

and the RSFSR. These *settings were operationally defined so that they only* included Party leaders in each particular republic and those individuals who published statements in the republic Party press.[8]

Stances on Poland

For the purposes of this study, Soviet stances on Poland in 1980-81 were classified according to three different tendencies. A tendency constitutes a mass of common articulations or statements in an issue area which persists over time.[9]

Before discussing the various tendencies themselves, note that Soviet discourse on most public policy issues, including the 1980-81 Polish crisis, is very euphemistic. The euphemistic nature of Soviet public statements renders them highly susceptible to all types of inferences. For instance, Soviet policy-makers often demanded that the Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) authorities "rebuff counterrevolution." This formulation seems to imply the need to use force in dealing with Solidarity.

The several tendencies each represented varying degrees of perception of threat posed by the crisis, as expressed by Soviet policy-makers and spokesmen. They also reflected differing assessments of the ability of the PUWP leadership to overcome the crisis. In order to classify the statements into their appropriate tendencies, they were closely examined for the key arguments and formulations. The "pessimistic" tendency reflected a preponderance of the highest degree of threat perception, along with the most pessimistic assessment of the ability of the Polish authorities to overcome the crisis. The "optimistic" tendency, on the other hand, reflected a predominantly low degree of threat perception, along with a high degree of confidence in the ability of the PUWP authorities to overcome the crisis. The "mixed" tendency fell between these two extremes, often giving equal weight to both the "optimistic" and "pessimistic" tendencies.

Pessimists argued that the "grave" crisis (Moscow home service, 19 July 1981) was the result of "Western interference in Polish affairs" (Petrov, 1980a) as well as "anti-socialist elements" in Poland (Petrov, 1980b) and "revisionists" who prevented the PUWP from rebuffing "counterrevolution" (Losoto, 1981). Some alleged that socialism was "insufficiently developed" in Poland (Kuznetsov, 1981) and denounced the idea of free trade unions and "different models of socialism" (Bugaev, 1981, pp. 173-174). Most pessimists stated that "Poland could rely on its friends and allies" (Ponomarev, 1980), while some argued that the threat to socialism in Poland was not just a matter of concern to Poland, but to the entire socialist community (Sinitsin, 1981).

66

Proponents of the "mixed" tendency claimed that if "Western interference" was a cause, so were "mistakes by the previous Polish leadership" (Grishin, 1981). They felt Solidarity was divided between influential "extremists" and the rank and file, the former thwarting the efforts of the PUWP authorities, especially the PUWP First Secretary Stanislaw Kania, to resolve a "complex" crisis (Moscow home service, 29 January 1981; Brezhnev, 1982, p. 21; Meeting of the Leaders..., 1980).

Optimists saw the crisis as rooted in errors of "management" and felt that the workers were not opposed to socialism but to its "distortions" (Kharkov, 1980; Moscow home service, 12 October 1980). Poland was a "strong" socialist state where the PUWP was actively working to overcome, and "fully capable of" overcoming, the crisis (Moscow home service, 14 September 1980; "A Friendly Working Visit," 1980). To do so it had to "improve its links with the masses" through limited reform (Legantsev, 1981).

Data Analysis

A total of 185 Soviet statements on Poland during the 1980-81 crisis were subjected to a number of statistical tests both to determine the relationship between tendency alignment (the propensity of an individual to align with a particular tendency) and related institutional, occupational, and ethnic affiliation, and also to highlight differences in opinion on Poland among individuals in the various settings under investigation. For the purpose of the study, the independent variable is institutional, occupational, or ethnic affiliation. The dependent variable is tendency orientation (pessimistic, mixed, or optimistic).

At first, the statements were grouped according to the tendency espoused by the particular spokesman and his/her institutional, occupational, or ethnic affiliation. Then a number of statistical tests were performed on the data. The first statistical test involved the calculation of Cramer's V for each set of institutional, occupational, and ethnic settings. A high value of Cramer's V would indicate a strong relationship between setting and tendency.

The second statistical test of the data involved the calculation of significant differences between the proportions of pessimistic statements for the Politburo/Secretariat and for each of the settings that were investigated. In each of these cases, the proportion of pessimistic statements is equivalent to the ratio of the number of pessimistic statements to total number of statements on Poland. The reason why the Politburo/Secretariat served as the basis of comparison was due to their central role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. All of the major decision. in the area of foreign policy are

made by the Politburo. The Secretariat contains various departments concerned with foreign policy matters (International, Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties, International Information; the last of these three departments was abolished in 1986). (Petrov, 1973; Alexander, 1984, pp. 12-16) The measure of statistical significance used was the Z-score, which involved the difference between two proportions.[10] For the purpose of this study, a .05 level of significance was employed.

The third statistical test involved the calculation of significant differences between the proportions of pessimistic statement for each setting and the pessimistic proportion for all settings as a whole, also by means of Z-scores. Any statistically significant differences in these cases could illustrate important differences of opinion on Poland among the various settings, and could provide important clues as to possible coalitions of institutional, occupational, and ethnic actors that were trying to affect Soviet policy on Poland in 1980-81.

Observations

Institutional Settings. As far as the Politburo and Secretariat are concerned, opinion on Poland was almost equally divided between the pessimistic and the two non-pessimistic tendencies.

Slightly over half of all the statements (51%) by members and candidate members of the Politburo and Secretariat can be classified as pessimistic, while the rest of the statements are divided between the mixed and optimistic tendencies.

As far as individual members or candidate members of the Politburo and Secretariat are concerned, there is a definite division of opinion. Of those individuals who expressed themselves on the crisis more than once, Central Committee secretary Mikhail Suslov consistently expressed pessimistic views on the crisis, and the views of Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov were almost always pessimistic.[11] The views of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko grew more pessimistic as the crisis progressed.[12] CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev consistently expressed mixed views on the crisis and Central Committee secretary Konstantin Chernenko did so almost as consistently.[13] Central Committee secretary Boris Ponomarev's statements on the crisis went from optimistic to mixed as the crisis progressed.[14]

Table 1: Tendency Alignment Among Institutional Settings

Setting	Optimistic		Mixed		Pessimistic		Total
	N	%[a]	N	%	N	%	N
Politburo/Secretariat	2	6.9	12	41.4	15	51.7	29
KGB	0	-	0	-	3	100.0	3
Ministry, Defense	4	11.8	3	8.8	27[c]	79.4	34
Ministry, Foreign Aff.	3	30.0	4	40.0	3	30.0	10[e]
Internat'l Department	2	50.0	2	50.0	0[b]	-	4[e]
DLCWP	0	-	2	100.0	0	-	2[d]
Internat'l Information	3	60.0	1	20.0	1	20.0	5[e]
Trade unions	1	7.1	1	7.1	12[b]	85.8	14
Komsomol	0	-	1	25.0	3	75.0	4
Totals	15	14.3	26	24.8	64	60.1	105

Cramer's V = .494

[a]% is ratio between N of a particular tendency and total N of the setting.

[b]Z-score for this setting vs. Politburo/Secretariat significant at p.05

[c]Z-score for this setting vs. Politburo/Secretariat significant at p.01

[d]Z-score for this setting vs. total significant at p.05

[e]Z-score for this setting vs. total significant at p.01

[f] Cramer's V score does not include figures from Politburo/Secretariat.

Unlike the other institutional settings investigated, the Politburo/Secretariat makes policy; it does not implement policy or discuss policy options (Alexander, 1984).

Sources: See note 5.

In the other institutional settings, there were obvious differences in opinion between individuals in the various institutions that were investigated. Of the few views expressed by the KGB, the proportions of pessimistic sentiment were high; they were likewise high in the trade unions, and the Komsomol, and in the many views put forth by the Ministry of Defense. In contrast they were quite low in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the three Central Committee departments concerned with foreign affairs (the International Department, the International Information Department, and the Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties-DLCWP).

Turning to an examination of the Z-scores, we see that opinion among members of the Ministry of Defense and trade unions was significantly more pessimistic than among members of the Politburo/Secretariat, while opinion in the International Department was significantly less pessimistic than that in

69

the Politburo and Secretariat. The views of individuals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the three Central Committee departments concerned with foreign affairs were significantly less pessimistic than the total of individuals in all the settings under investigation.[15]

The total proportion of pessimistic statements for all institutional settings did not differ significantly from that on the Politburo and Secretariat, as well as that for all the settings as a whole. As for the relationship between institutional setting and stance on Poland, Cramer's V does indicate a moderate relationship.

Occupational Settings. Among the occupational settings, the proportions of pessimistic sentiment were high for all settings under investigation except the cultural establishment and writers.

The ideologists and the economists/planners were significantly more pessimistic than the Politburo/Secretariat while the cultural establishment was significantly less pessimistic. If one examines the writers, the results are not statistically significant. Finally, the Cramer's V for Table 2 indicates that there was not much of a difference between the stance on Poland of various occupational settings.

Table 2: Tendency Alignment Among Occupational Settings

Setting	Optimistic		Mixed		Pessimistic		Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Ideologists	2	10.0	1	5.0	17[b]	85.0	20
Economists/planners	0	-	2	28.6	5	71.4	7
Cultural establishment	1	33.3	1	33.3	1[a]	33.3	3
Writers	0	-	1	50.0	1	50.0	2
Totals	3	9.4	5	15.6	24	75.0	32

Cramer's V = .357

[a] Z-score for this setting vs. Politburo/Secretariat significant at p.05
[b] Z-score for this setting vs. Politburo/Secretariat significant at p.01
Sources: See note 5.

Ethnic Settings. As far as the ethnic settings are concerned (Table 3), the proportions of pessimistic statements were high for the Baltic republics, the other non-Slavic nationalities, and the RSFSR, and moderately high for the Ukrainians. The proportion was low for the Byelorussians.

However, as far as the total for the Baltic republics, the Latvians in particular, and the RSFSR are concerned, the proportion of pessimistic

statements was significantly higher than that of the Politburo/Secretariat. This indicates that Party officials in these republics were extremely concerned about the impact of the Polish events in the region.

Table 3: Tendency Alignment Among Ethnic Settings

Setting	Optimistic		Mixed		Pessimistic		Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Lithuanians	0	-	1	20.0	4	80.0	5
Latvians	0	-	1	14.3	6[a]	85.7	7
Estonians	0	-	0	-	2	100.0	2
Total Baltic Republics	0	-	2	14.3	12[a]	85.7	14
Ukrainians	1	7.7	3	23.1	9	69.2	13
Byelorussians	2	50.0	1	25.0	1	25.0	4[b]
Other non-Russian	0	-	1	20.0	4	80.0	5
RSFSR	0	-	1	10.0	9[a]	90.0	10
Overall Totals	3	6.5	8	17.4	35	76.1	46

Cramer's V = .424

[a]Z-score for this setting vs. Politburo/Secretariat significant at p.05
[b]Z-score for this setting vs. total significant at p.05
Sources: See note 5.

It is surprising that the crisis did not receive extensive coverage in Estonia, where the authorities faced riots in October 1980 and the possibility of a one-hour general strike in Tallinn in December 1981. (Vardys, 1983) However, an article by Estonian Party First Secretary Karl Vaino (1983, p. 51) in *Kommunist* made an explicit linkage between the November 1981 strike threat and the Polish crisis.

The proportion of pessimistic statements on Poland in the RSFSR was also significantly higher than that for the Politburo and Secretariat. It should be noted that coverage of the crisis in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* was consistently pessimistic.

As far as the Ukrainians and Byelorussians were concerned, sentiment on Poland did not differ significantly from that on the Politburo/Secretariat. However, the Byelorussian Party leadership expressed views that were significantly less pessimistic than those of all the settings as a whole. This suggests that there was much less concern about the Polish crisis in the two non-Russian Slavic republics bordering on Poland than in the Baltic republics. Also, it seemed as if the Ukrainian Party leadership took on a much lower profile towards Poland in 1980-81 than it did towards

71

Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Ukrainian Party First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytsky made only one (mixed tendency) statement on Poland throughout the entire crisis and he did not participate in any of the negotiations between the Soviet and Polish leaders in 1980-81, unlike his predecessor Petro Shelest, who took part in the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis with the respective Czechoslovak leadership.[16]

The relationship between ethnic setting and stance on Poland, as indicated by Cramer's V, was not very strong. Thus, it does not appear that the views of all Soviet officials concerning Poland were a function of their proximity to Poland. The hypothesized relationship between ethnicity and views on Poland was not confirmed in this case.

Overall Results. Combining the total number of pessimistic articulations for all of the settings investigated and the total number of articulations for all settings with the exception of the Politburo and Secretariat, the proportion of total pessimistic articulations is .703.

This proportion was significantly higher than that of the Politburo/Secretariat at a .05 level of significance. As far as the overall relationship between setting and stance on Poland is concerned, the value for Cramer's V was .111, and this was weak. Thus, considering all of the settings investigated, there is not much of a relationship between setting and stance on Poland.

Table 4: Breakdown of Overall Results [a]

Setting	Optimistic		Mixed		Pessimistic		Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Institutional	13	17.1	14	18.4	49	64.5	76
Occupational	3	9.4	5	15.6	24	75.0	32
Ethnic	3	6.5	8	17.4	35	76.1	46
Overall Results	19	12.2	27	17.5	108	70.3	154

Cramer's V = .111

[a] This excludes the "Politburo/Secretariat" category.

Conclusion

Despite the lack of an overall relationship between setting and stance on Poland[17], there was a significantly higher level of concern about the Polish crisis in the expressed views of officials in the middle-level bureaucracy than those on the Politburo/Secretariat. In the final analysis, those on the

Politburo/Secretariat who espoused a pessimistic view on the crisis might have been able to draw upon the support of those in the middle level of the bureaucracy to promote their views in the Politburo and Secretariat and prevail in the end. In the final months of the Polish crisis, pessimistic views on the crisis were overwhelmingly dominant in the Soviet media (Ploss, 1986; Cynkin, 1988; Brautigam, 1988, pp. 210-242).

Since Soviet statements on Poland were expressions of how spokesmen in various settings defined the situation, not advocacies of specific courses of action by the Soviet leadership, we cannot directly relate each statement to a specific policy preference. In general, however, a pessimistic tendency was associated with confrontational policies towards Poland, and optimistic and mixed tendencies were associated with more conciliatory policies. Thus, pessimists generally favored a quick resolution of the crisis involving the use of force, as they were obviously more concerned about the impact of the crisis on the coherence and unity of the Soviet bloc, while optimists and those who expressed a mixed tendency favored a more gradual resolution of the crisis by political means (Ploss, 1986, p. 2; Brautigam, 1988 pp. 342-345).

This methodology may be appropriate for studying the stances of officials in other issue areas and determining the composition of various tendency or opinion groupings in these issue areas. Even though this study was one of a foreign policy crisis at the end of the Brezhnev regime, the methodology might be used more successfully if applied to public policy issues facing the Gorbachev regime, thanks to the impact of glasnost and the efforts by Gorbachev to promote pluralism and debate in the Soviet political system.

NOTES

1) Of course, institutional or occupational affiliation is not the only contributing factor to decision-makers' foreign policy stances according to this approach. Factors such as position within the institution and personal interests also play a role. However, institutional affiliation is a major factor. Furthermore, even though the proponents of the bureaucratic politics approach claim that this approach is applicable to the foreign policy of all states, this model has almost exclusively been used in the U.S. context.

2) Note that the bureaucratic and interest group approaches to Soviet politics fell into disfavor after 1979. Reasons for this are both substantive and methodological. Substantively, many of the reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s were reversed by the Brezhnev leadership resulting in the suppression of what had appeared to be an emerging civil

73

society in the USSR under Khrushchev. In addition, weaknesses in the interest group and bureaucratic politics approaches, the lack of scientific rigor in the testing of the basic assumptions of these approaches, and the difficulty of defining such concepts as "group" made their analytical frameworks vulnerable to the criticisms of its skeptics (Terry, 1979; Skilling, 1983).

3) For an examination of the difficulty in using these approaches in analyzing debates on domestic and foreign policy issues, compare: Ploss, 1965 and Hough, 1986.

As far as making inferences from Soviet public statements is concerned, some scholars have employed "propaganda analysis," a method of inferences based upon the logic of the situation. The scholar would make a list of the probable alternatives to the decision-maker, and make comparisons in the media content relating to each of the probable alternatives. See Ploss, 1986, p. 2 and Cutler, 1985, pp. 82-84.

4) It was on August 31, 1980 that the Polish government and the striking workers in Gdansk signed the agreements permitting the establishment of trade unions independent of Party control. The crisis ended on December 31, 1981 when PUWP First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law and cracked down on Solidarity and its supporters.

5) The Soviet publications that were employed in this study included: *Pravada, Izvestiya, Krasnaya zvezda, Trud, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, Literaturnaya gazeta, Komsomolskaya pravda, Kommunist, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, Kommunist Ukrainy, Kommunist Belorussii, Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, Kommunist Estonii, Pid praporom lenninizmu, Partiinaya zhizn, Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, and published anthologies of that public statements of the Soviet leaders at the time. The translated material employed in this study included statements by Soviet leaders in the print and electronic media. They included: *Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Joint Publications Research Service*, and the *BBC Survey of World Broadcasts*.

6) As far as the Politburo/Secretariat is concerned, all statements by both full and candidate members of these two bodies were treated as part of this setting. This setting was not examined for the possible impact of institutional affiliation on the stances of members of that setting, but for any significant differences in views between the top leadership as represented by the Politburo and Secretariat, and the other institutional, occupational, or ethnic settings.

74

7) Dissident cultural or literary figures were not studied because their works do not enjoy official sanction.

8) Thus, the emphasis was on the Party leadership just in each of these ethnic settings, not on the ethnic affiliations of all the individuals treated in this study, and opinions on Poland by nationalist dissidents in these non-Russian areas were not considered. The focus is on whether Party officials in non-Russian republics in proximity to Poland were more concerned about the Polish crisis than those who weren't.

9) The idea of classifying Soviet official statements on a particular issue area into articulations of various "tendencies" originates from the articles by Franklyn Griffiths (1971) on "tendency analysis" in the volume *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*. Other works that deal with Soviet tendencies include: Clemens, 1978; Griffiths, 1984. Expressed views on Poland in the Soviet media are not the only indication from which one can make definitive conclusions about an individual's alignment with a particular tendency coalition. There is the possibility that a key Soviet decision-maker played a significant role in managing the 1980-81 Polish crisis without expressing his or her views in the Soviet media. However, without access to inside information on what occurred in the Politburo at that time, the media are a useful surrogate to gauge various coalitions on Poland.

10) The second and third sets of statistical tests were done using the Z-scores that were obtained as a result of the computation from the differences between two proportions of pessimistic statements. The two proportions are the proportion of pessimistic statements (pessimistic articulations/total number of articulations) for each setting and for the Politburo/Secretariat or the overall figure for all the settings. The formula for the computation of the Z-score of the difference between two proportions can be found in Blalock, 1979, pp. 232-234.

11) See Suslov, 1981a, p. 10; 1981b; 1982, p. 366 for a compilation of his views on the Polish crisis. For Ustinov's views, see *Pravda*, 11 December 1980, 21 February, 25 July, 13 and 19 September 1981 and *Krasnaya zvezda*, 10 December 1981.

12) See Gromyko, 1984, pp. 243, 274 and Gromyko in *Pravda*, 23 September 1981 for Gromyko's views on the crisis.

13) The views of Brezhnev on the crisis can be found in Brezhnev, 1982, pp. 21, 106, 181. Chernenko's views on the crisis can be found in Chernenko, 1984, pp. 16, 39, 73.

14) Ponomarev's views on the crisis can be found in: *Le Monde*, 19 December 1980 and Ponomarev, 1981.

75

15) These conclusions can be confirmed in: Weitz, 1988 and Frost, 1989. Frost uses a .01 level of significance in his study of divergences in views between the political (Politburo and Secretariat) and military leaderships in the USSR and found that there was no significant difference in views between these two sets of leadership on the 1980-81 Polish crisis at the .01 level. However, he admits that these views might be significant at the .05 level (Frost, 1989, p. 121).

16) Shcherbytsky was known to have only one meeting with a Polish official during the 1980-81 crisis, and that was with the Polish Consul-General in Kiev on April 17, 1981. (Central Intelligence Agency, 1982, p. 46) Shcherbytsky's views on the crisis can be found in Shcherbytsky, 1981.

17) This is due to the fact that in most settings, pessimistic views prevailed, which results in a low value for Cramer's V.

REFERENCES

A Friendly Working Visit. 1980. *New Times*. 45:8.

ALEXANDER, Arthur J. 1984. Modelling Soviet Defense Decisionmaking. In Jiri Valenta and William Porter, eds.: 9-22.

ALLISON, Graham T. 1971. *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little and Brown.

ASPATURIAN, Vernon V. 1971. *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little and Brown.

BLALOCK, Jr., Hubert M. 1979. *Social Statistics*. New York: McGraw Hill.

BRAUTIGAM, Curtis R. 1988. A Tendency Analysis of the Soviet Responses to the 1980-81 Polish Crisis. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.

BREZHNEV, Leonid I. 1982. *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*. Moscow: Novosti.

BUGAEV, Ye. 1981. Politika partii--schastye naroda (The policy of the Party--the happiness of the people). *Oktyabr*. 2:173-180.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 1982. *Appearances of Soviet Leaders: January-December 1981*. March 1982.

CHERNENKO, Konstantin U. 1984. *Utverzhdat leninskii stil v partiinom rabote. (To Affirm the Leninist Style in Party Work)*. Moscow: Politizdat.

CLEMENS, Walter C. 1978. *The USSR and Global Interdependence*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

CUTLER, Robert M. 1985. Domestic and Foreign Influences in Policy Making. *Soviet Studies* 37:60-89.

76

CYNKIN, Thomas M. 1988. *Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

FROST, Howard E. 1989. A Content Analysis of Recent Soviet Party-Military Relations. *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 91-135.

GRIFFITHS, Franklyn. 1971. A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy-Making. In Griffiths and Skilling, eds.: 335-377.

--- 1984. The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and their Policy Implications. *International Security*. 9:3-50.

--- and H. Gordon Skilling, eds. 1971., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

GRISHIN, Viktor V. 1981. 15 July 1981. Rech tovarishcha V.V. Grishin (The Speech of Comrade V.V. Grishin). *Pravda*.

GROMYKO, Andrei. 1981. 23 September 1981. *Pravda*.

--- 1984. *Leninskim Kursom mire: izbrannye rechi i statyi* (With the Leninst Course of Peace: Selected Speeches and Articles). Moscow: Politizdat.

HALPERIN, Morton H. and Arnold Kanter, eds. 1973. *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective*. Boston: Little and Brown.

HALPERIN, Morton H. 1974. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington: Brookings Institution.

HARRIS, Jonathan. 1984. The Perplexed Elite: Political Conflict in the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1964-1966. In Linden and Rockman, eds.: 293-323.

HODNETT, Grey and Peter J. Potichnyj. 1970. *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*. Canberra: Austrailian National University.

HOUGH, Jerry. 1986. *The Struggle For the Third World*. Washington: Brookings.

KHARKOV, L. 1980. Fidelity to Socialism. *New Times*. 38:6-7.

KUZNETSOV, Feliks 1981. 6 May 1981. Puteshestvie v Polshu (Trip to Poland). *Literaturnaya gazeta*.

LANGSAM, David E. and David Paul. 1972. Soviet Politics and the Group Approach: A Conceptual Note. *Slavic Review 31:136-141*.

LEGANTSEV, Nikolai. 1981. Choice for All Time. *New Times*. 30:5-6.

Le Monde. 19 December 1980.

LINDEN, Ron H. and Bert A. Rockman, eds. 1984. *Elite Studies and Communist Politics*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

LOSOTO, O. 1981. 13 April 1981. Communists from the Warel Plant. *Pravda*. In *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, (*CDSP*). 33 (15): 19-20.

MEETING OF THE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES. 6 December 1980. *Pravda*.

MOSCOW HOME SERVICE, 14 September 1980. In *Survey of World Broadcasts, (SWB)*. 17 September 1980. SU/6525/C/1.

---, 12 October 1980. In *SWB*. 14 October 1980. SU/6548/C2/1.

---, 29 January 1981. In *SWB*. 30 January 1981. SU/6636/C/2.

---, 19 July 1981. In *SWB*. 22 July 1981. SU/6781/A2/2.

PETROV, A. 1980a. 6 September 1980. If This Isn't Interference, What Is? *Pravda*. In *CDSP* 32 (36):5.

--- 1980b. 27 September 1980. Interference in the PPR's Internal Affairs Continues. *Pravda*. In *CDSP* 32 (38):6.

PETROV, Vladimir. 1973. Formulation of Soviet Foreign Policy. *Orbis*. 17:819-850.

PLOSS, Sydney I. 1965. *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

---. 1986. *Moscow and the Polish Crisis*. Boulder: Westview.

PONOMAREV, Boris. 1981. On the International Significance of the 26th Congress of the CPSU. *Kommunist 5*. In *Moscow News* supplement 1981. 16:4-5.

PONOMAREV, M. 1980. 28 December 1980. Cold Winds Over Europe. *Krasnaya zvezda*. In *CDSP*. 32 (51): 2-3.

SCHWARTZ, Joel J. 1968. Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union. *American Political Science Review*. 62: 840-851.

SHCHERBYTSKY, V. 1981. Speech to the Communist Party aktiv. *Kommunist Ukrainy*. 4:72-80.

SINITSIN, Lgor. 1981. 24 April 1981. The Great Strength of Unity. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. In *CDSP*. 33 (17): 4,20.

SKILLING, H. Gordon. 1983. Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited. *World Politics*. 36:1-27.

STEWART, Philip D. 1969. Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process. *World Politics* 22: 29-50.

SUSLOV, Mikhail. 1981a. The Historic Significance of the 26th CPSU Congress. *World Marxist Review*. 5:4-12.

---. 1981b. Vysokoe prizvanie i otvetstvennost (High Calling and Responsibility). 14 October 1981. *Pravda*.

---. 1982. *Marksizm-leninizm i sovremennaya epokha: izbrannye statyi i rechi* (Marxism-Leninism and the Contemporary Epoch: Selected Speeches and Articles), III. Moscow: Politizdat.

TERRY, Sarah M. 1979. Introduction--Pluralism in Communist Societies: Is the Emperor Naked? *Studies in Comparative Communism*. 12(1):3-5.

USTINOV Dmitri. 11 December 1980. *Pravda*.

---. 21 February 1981. *Pravda*.

---. 25 July 1981. *Pravda*.

---. 13 September 1981. *Pravda*.

---. 19 September 1981. *Pravda*.

---. 10 December 1981. *Krasnaya zvezda*.

VAINO, Karl. 1983. S tochnym znaniem obstanovki (With an exact knowledge of the circumstances). *Kommunist*. 4:51-61.

VALENTA, Jiri. 1979. *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

--- and William Porter, eds. 1984. *Soviet Decision-making for National Defense*. Boston: George Allen & Unwin.

VARDYS, V. Stanley. 1983. Polish Echoes in the Baltic. *Problems of Communism*. 32:21-34.

WEITZ, Richard. 1988. Soviet Decision-Making and the Polish Crisis. *East European Quarterly*. 32: 191-212.

79